

# Repeated Games

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We will follow (parts of) the book of Mailath and Samuelson “Repeated Games and Reputations”.

We will study

1. Games with Perfect Monitoring (Chapters 2 and 3 in the book),
2. Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (parts of Chapters 7 – 10 in the book, including the Folk Theorem), and if time permits, we can either study
3. Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring, or
4. Reputations (depending on the taste of the audience).

Grading will be based either on a take-home exam or an oral exam (we will decide this together), and definitely also on active participation in class.

Literature:

Mailath, George, and Samuelson, Larry: Repeated Games and Reputations, 2006, Oxford University Press.